Common beliefs of sikhs and muslims relationship

Sikh Vs. Islam | Synonym

It was developed as an answer to the two majoritarian religions in India: Hinduism and Islam. Learn about this religion of 20 million adepts. Why do (many, not all) Sikhs hate Islam/Muslims so much? . but more to do with the partition and India's rocky relationship with Pakistan. .. If you study the religion and the gurus, you will as a Muslim see that the religion is. There are quite a few similarities between Sikhism & Islam: 1. Concept of God: The Book of Mormon can help you build a relationship with God. Have a free.

According to traditional Sikh historiography, the conflict was a religious one, opposing a fanatical Muslim tyrant and the Sikh Guru, ready to sacrifice his life for the sake of religious freedom, in that particular instance of a community other than his own. This last point is important in Sikhs perception of themselves as defenders of the weak and the oppressed.

Muslims have a completely different reading of the period: The Arya Samaj and Hindu nationalists propose yet another interpretation: Sikh traditional understanding of this event is archetypal of the triad mentioned above, Aurangzeb as the oppressor, the Kashmiri Brahmins as the victims but also as the taunts, in some accounts and the Guru as the martyr. At the centre stands the martyrdom of Guru Tegh Bahadur. I will develop this point below when talking about the Singh Sabha.

They are 18th century hagiographical accounts of the sixth and tenth Sikh Gurus, highlighting their military skills and courage, the martial ethos they wanted to impart on the Sikhs—an approach to the lives of the Gurus very different from the Janam Sakhi literature mentioned above.

As we can expect, the Muslim figures prominently, in this literature, as the persecutor: Without a tormentor, there is no martyr: Indeed some of the crudest components of the anti-Islam theme as present in the Rahitnamas and the Gurbilas have been expurgated by the Singh Sabha reformists.

Hence, the Singh Sabha recasting of the Rahit, that was to ultimately lead to the promulgation of the current Rahit Maryada inillustrates this euphemisation trend. Fenech refers to Sikh dominance of the Panjab under Ranjit Singh and his displacement of Mughal rule as a possible explanation, H.

McLeod to the influence of colonial understanding of communal relations, deligitimizing open expressions of enmity FenechMcLeod But most crucially, the project of the Singh Sabha to redefine Sikh identity created a new figure of Otherness, the Hindu.

The Tat Khalsa, the Singh Sabha radical wing that ultimately gained prominence, wanted to demonstrate that the Sikhs are a separate community, distinct from both Hindus and Muslims. As we can infer from its title, it was first written in Hindi 7 and addressed as much to Hindus as to Sikhs and since then it has become a classic proclamation of Sikh identity as reinterpreted by the Singh Sabha of which Bhai Kahn Singh, its author, was an eminent protagonist.

It was released in a context of strong antagonism between the Tat Khalsa and the Arya Samaj whom the former identified as the new enemy of the Panth.

This antagonism was made all the more acute by the conversion issue. Christian mass conversions, mostly of low castes and untouchables, led Hindu, Sikh and Muslim reform movements into an aggressive and competitive proselytism, of which Panjab became the privileged ground from the s. It is noteworthy that the first Singh Sabha was set up in Amritsar, in reaction to the conversion of Sikh students to Christianity in Besides the Arya Samaj and the Church, the Ahmeddyia were also prominent in these conversion activities, targeting specifically Sikhs.

Sikhism: a religion between Hinduism and Islam - Le Journal International

But Arya activism was increasingly perceived by Sikh reformists as the greatest of all threats, all the more that this perception found an echo in colonial ideology. For instance, a recurring theme of British orientalism, that of Sikhism in danger of re-absorption into Hinduism, was re-appropriated by the Tat Khalsa and fed their antagonism with the Arya Samaj.

According to a famous phrase by Macauliffe: Hinduism … is like the boa constrictor of the Indian forests. When a petty enemy appears to worry it, it winds round its opponent, crushes it in its folds and finally causes it to disappear … in this way it is disposing of the reformed and once hopeful religion of Baba Nanak … [that is] making a vigorous struggle for life, but its ultimate destruction is inevitable without State support Macauliffe At par with the Arya Samaj, the Tat Khalsa targeted another enemy, all the more dangerous that it was an insider: Within a complex social fabric characterised, in 19th century Panjab, by the plurality, the flexibility and the interpenetration of communal identities, the Singh Sabha reformers undertook to draw clear-cut boundaries between Sikhs and other Panjabis, and to impose these boundaries on Sikhs and non-Sikhs alike.

I shall come now to the Singh Sabha usage of martyrdom, alluded to above, in establishing the limits of this separate identity, as superbly analysed by Fenech This rhetoric of martyrdom, to use his phrase, appears quite relevant to our present study as it entails a specific construction of the Self as victim and of the Others as inimical figures.

To understand this correlation, we have to come back to the heroic period of the Panth, the 18th century, as it is perceived by Sikhs since the Singh Sabha period. Sikhs were persecuted, so the tradition goes, by a tyrannical enemy and resisted till death to uphold their faith. As the Arabic term shahid widely used by Sikhs since the 19th century to refer to their martyrs implies, they were witnesses to truth through the sacrifice of their life.

It is particularly in defence of the visible symbols of the faith—especially kesh, the hair and the turban—that they were martyred. Their sacrifice became, in the hands of the Singh Sabha, a powerful tool firstly to promote Khalsa identity and deligitimize non-Khalsa ones, and secondly to proclaim the separate identity of the Sikhs.

Their martyrdom rhetoric therefore consolidated both inner boundaries between Khalsa and non-Khalsa and outer ones between Sikhs and non-Sikhs. This is not specific to the Singh Sabha, as their Muslim and Hindu counterparts have engaged in the same task. I have already mentioned how some key events have given way to very different, often contradictory, communal interpretations see for instance the martyrdom of Guru Tegh Bahadur or the reign of Ranjit Singh, hailed by the Sikhs, dreaded by the Muslims.

I wish now to underscore firstly how the Singh Sabha has fashioned Sikh history as the history of martyrdom and secondly how it has established continuity, contemporaneity between selected past events and the present. Likewise Sikh participation in the communal riots of the s and s and in the carnage of the partition is not acknowledged. As stated by Veena Dasall acts of violence are constructed as the violence of martyrdom, any evil acts being projected on the Other Hindu or Muslim.

It is true at the turn of the 20th century, when the Arya Samaj first and later, during the Gurdwara Reform Movement in the s, the Mahants Hindu custodians of the Gurdwaras are equated with the dreaded Afghans and Mughals of the 18th century.

It is also true in the s, during the confrontation of Sikh neo-fundamentalists with the central Indian State, perceived as a dominating and aggressive Hindu entity, a confrontation projected as the continuation of a long series of struggles to preserve Sikh identity.

Hence, the Singh Sabha concern to demonstrate that Sikhs are not Hindus tended to euphemize the anti-Muslim theme and to identify the Hindu as the new enemy.

Sikhism: 5 Things To Know About The Sikh Religion

Hence, after a relatively peaceful communal climate following the imposition of the Pax Britannica in Panjab in the second half of the 19th century, the first half of the twentieth was a contrario characterised by an increasingly tense and conflictual context, marked out by the issue of a separate electorate granted to Muslims inby the heightened competition between communities for a larger share of political representation and power, and by the launching of the Pakistan movement by the Muslim League in the early s.

The resulting communal riots of the s and s followed a well known pattern, with Sikhs and Hindus allied against Muslims. Fenech opens his analysis of the Singh Sabha rhetorical use of martyrdom with the story of Lachman Singh, hanged in June for the murder of three Muslims, who had converted to Islam a Hindu lambadar village chief Fenech This seemingly anecdotic event is in fact highly revealing.

As discussed above, it raised, among community leaders, fear of numerical and therefore political decline and increased communal competition and conflicts.

And in the case of Sikhs, one cannot fail to draw a parallel with the spectre of persecutions and forced conversions to Islam of the 18th century. Remarkably, Lachman Singh story follows the same pattern of the martyr-victim-oppressor triangular relationship that I have already mentioned. A period of great instability and uncertainty for the Sikhs, who greatly objected to the creation of Pakistan then to the idea of partition, and supported various counter-schemes such as Azad Panjab, Sikhistan or Khalistan, opposed by both the Congress and the League.

Your trials await you. Be ready for self-destruction like the Japs and the Nazis …. Similar speeches were delivered by leaders of the three communities, equally busy in preparing for civil war.

The carefully nurtured memory of past conflicts played a major part in the outburst of violence surrounding partition—and this is especially true of Muslim-Sikh antagonism. See also Pandey McLeod for this in This partition of memory was all the easier in the case of Panjab that partition of the territory led to an entire exchange of population, to the extent that there are no Hindus and Sikhs left in West Panjab and hardly any Muslims in East Panjab except for the former principality of Malherkotla and Qadian.

But did they really meet in the diaspora? Here is the question I wish now to address. Sociologists have established a linkage between colonial representations and policy vis a vis the various communities the British ruled—in particular their role in fostering sharply defined communal identities—and British policy towards immigrants in post-colonial Britain.

This policy, as it culminated in the s, deals with communities, not individuals as in France, defined primarily, in the case of South Asians, in terms of religious affiliation.

It has more specifically institutionalized and legitimized the most conservative or orthodox definitions of these identities. This has had several consequences: South Asian community leaders are primarily religious leaders specially so in the case of Sikhs and Muslims ; religious-based organisations have received the greatest share of public support and funding, they have been more successful at mobilising immigrants than pan-Asian or pan-Indian ones and they do so on religious issues the turban of the Sikhs, the provision of halal meat in school for Muslim children….

In short, communities are encouraged to stress their cultural specificities, while competing for public resources and recognition, and in this process minority identities tend to be reified and institutionalised. Their mobilisation for the right to wear the turban as a bus driver, then on a motorcycle or in school culminated in a House of Lords ruling ofgranting them the status of an ethnic group.

This specific recognition allowed them to benefit from the legislation against discrimination paradoxically defined on ethnic or racial grounds, not religious one that has been so far denied to Muslims.

British multicultural policy, although officially striving for the opposite, has resulted in stiff competition between communities, defined internally as homogenous and externally by rigid boundaries. So much so that I quickly decided to avoid direct questioning on the issue of relations with the Muslims. Although they share some similarities, Sikhism and Islam are fundamentally different religions that reflect different beliefs about God.

These differences reflect fundamentally different views on the nature of the relationship between God and the individual, as well as differing practices of worship. Both religions have a long tradition and followers all over the world. Sikhism Sikhism is a relatively new religion dating back to the fifteenth century in the Punjab area, in what is now Northern India and Pakistan. The guru Nanak saw a divide between the Muslim and Hindu faiths and created a new religion centered around the direct love and worship of God.

Sikhs believe that by reflecting on the sacred relationship between language and thought, they can silence their ego and achieve a feeling of ecstasy and bliss. The central tenets of Sikhism preach the equality of all human beings and peace.

  • Sikh Vs. Islam
  • Sikhism: a religion between Hinduism and Islam

Its adepts are easily recognisable to their turban and long beards, symbol of resistance against the persecutions they underwent from Hindus and Muslims in the 17th century. They are also distinguishable from the names they give themselves: Living in permanent contact with Hinduism and Islam, he was neither convinced nor converted to one or the other, though he remained fascinated by spirituality.

He considered religion a way to unite men. The guru assembles around him a community worshipping a unique and absolute God which represents the Truth.

Frères ennemis? Relations between Panjabi Sikhs and Muslims in the Diaspora

Living examples of spirituality, nine gurus followed him to lead the congregation until The tenth guru, Gobind Singh, decided he would be the last and that religious authority would then be transmitted by the assembled Sikh community and the scriptures left by the five first gurus. As all religion, Sikhism has its own sacred book called Adi Granth.

Each guru participated in the development of the religion.