The Mind-Brain Relationship as a Mathematical Problem
The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) (which goes RTM defines such intentional mental states as relations to mental representations, and explains the of features of the brain and central nervous system. of phenomenal properties and their relation to the. and Maintenance: From Brain to Mind to Behavior. mental representations meaningfully relate to a person's chronic attachment style and the attachment dynamics of a specific relationship, as well as their effects on perception, behavior. MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE MIND BRAIN RELATIONSHIP 5 pathway among the from PSY at Grand Canyon University.
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Speech stimuli Descartes Point-of-View Neurons and Synapses Mental Representations and the Mind-Brain Relationship In cognitive neuro science all through the last few decades, as in philosophy in the last years, the issue of the mind-body or mind- brain occurrences is still open to discussion.
Illogically, ever since Descartes nobody has suggested a workable alternate view of this problem. Researchers and thinkers have offered some approaches, yet none has gained the assent of the majority of thinkers. During a person's daily toils the separation that goes on between an individual mind and consciousness is hardly ever thought about or talked about. But then again it is the primary cause for the majority of your existence problems.
This separation is not even a recognized fact, as consciousness and mind seem to act as one. And illogically they do. Nevertheless the separation is at the central of existence. It is what retains the materialist secluded from the spiritualist, possibly robbing advancing humanity from a progressive holistic center. With that being said, this essay will discuss the whether or not the mind and brain are fully separate or whether they are one entity.
The Dualism Argument Research shows that the strong dualism position of Descartes makes suggestion that the mind is all the way separate from the brain, and that, for that reason, there may be no detectable display of symbols in the brain. What some could possibly note as manifestations are usually called traces, and it has been noted that their existence has been argued throughout time.
Brain scans have been making the suggestion that nothing we recollect can be physically located in the brain and that there is not any geometrical place for the importance of the word "baby," nor is there an isolate location for the representation of a baseball. Nevertheless, fMRI scans reminder changes in the brain when a separate is memorizing new words.
On the other hand, the changes are unrefined, smeared descriptions with no identifying, comparative to the balance of neurons or small groups of them Bartels, However, the focus again in this assignment will make a statement on whether the mind and brain are completely distinct or whether they are one unit.
Research does show that the mind is of physical origin, fashioned out of a person's brain functions of memory, intellect, intuition and imagination. These brain functions go up and down upon demand making what is referred to as mind or mind purposes. How competently these mind tasks work actually has a lot to do with how naturally functional the brain is working, the interconnectivity of its chemical integrity and its circuitry Sevush, Also, this is what the materialist works and sees with: When the body is underprivileged of life, the brain deceases.
To the pure materialist that is the end of that, starting a potential doubting or an atheistic attitude. Pure Materialist Viewpoint Pure materialist scholars, philosophers etc. This conclusion can be reinforced by a diversity of scientifically verifiable brain function experiments. Also, one medical evidence of this contention is the devastating affliction recognized as senile dementia or Alzheimer's disease, characterized by progressively reduced availability to brain purposes.
As the brain the purposes in the brain fade away, so seemingly does the entity that used them bring about in impaired use of memory plus and intellect personality incompetence. By observation that is simple, it is reasonable to make the supposition that people are possibly the sum total of their own brain function production.
And once the body dies so does everything the brain functions produced. With that being said, this is a pure materialist perspective regarded upon fact that is observable. Theories When it comes to theories, a second materialist approach to the mind-body issue is called the identity theory, the outlook that brain activities and mental states are identical, though observed from two standpoints Baars, Like behaviorism, it is a materialist outlook of the mind insofar is it upholds that mind is basically physical in nature.
The contents of thoughts are represented in symbolic structures the formulas of Mentalese which, analogously to natural languages but on a much more abstract level, possess a syntax and semantics very much like those of natural languages. For the Spanish logician and cognitive scientist Luis M. Augusto, at this abstract, formal level, the syntax of thought is the set of symbol rules i.
Introduction to Cognitive Science. Strong vs weak, restricted vs unrestricted[ edit ] There are two types of representationalism, strong and weak. Strong representationalism attempts to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content. On the other hand, weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content. Strong representationalism aims to provide a theory about the nature of phenomenal character, and offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
In contrast to this, weak representationalism does not aim to provide a theory of consciousness, nor does it offer a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Strong representationalism can be further broken down into restricted and unrestricted versions. The restricted version deals only with certain kinds of phenomenal states e. Most representationalists endorse an unrestricted version of representationalism.
According to the unrestricted version, for any state with phenomenal character that state's phenomenal character reduces to its intentional content.
Only this unrestricted version of representationalism is able to provide a general theory about the nature of phenomenal character, as well as offer a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness. The successful reduction of the phenomenal character of a state to its intentional content would provide a solution to the hard problem of consciousness once a physicalist account of intentionality is worked out. Problems for the unrestricted version[ edit ] When arguing against the unrestricted version of representationalism people will often bring up phenomenal mental states that appear to lack intentional content.
The unrestricted version seeks to account for all phenomenal states. Thus, for it to be true, all states with phenomenal character must have intentional content to which that character is reduced. Phenomenal states without intentional content therefore serve as a counterexample to the unrestricted version. If the state has no intentional content its phenomenal character will not be reducible to that state's intentional content, for it has none to begin with.
A common example of this kind of state are moods. Moods are states with phenomenal character that are generally thought to not be directed at anything in particular.
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Moods are thought to lack directedness, unlike emotions, which are typically thought to be directed at particular things e. People conclude that because moods are undirected they are also nonintentional i. Because they are not directed at anything they are not about anything.
Because they lack intentionality they will lack any intentional content. Lacking intentional content their phenomenal character will not be reducible to intentional content, refuting the representational doctrine.
Though emotions are typically considered as having directedness and intentionality this idea has also been called into question. One might point to emotions a person all of a sudden experiences that do not appear to be directed at or about anything in particular. Emotions elicited by listening to music are another potential example of undirected, nonintentional emotions.
Emotions aroused in this way do not seem to necessarily be about anything, including the music that arouses them. The proponent of representationalism might also reject the narrow conception of intentionality as being directed at a particular thing, arguing instead for a broader kind of intentionality. What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content. What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.
What it is like to be in mood M is to have both a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content and a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.